GST private rulings added to site – November highlights

In November the ATO published over 70 GST private rulings on the Private Rulings Register.  Those rulings can be accessed from the new drop down menu item on the site and here.

Many of the rulings deal with “run of the mill” issues such as registration, real property sales and going concerns, however there are some interesting questions raised.  In particular, I refer to the following rulings:

11011962220496 – GST and credit cards annual fees

The question in this ruling request was whether a credit card annual fee represented consideration for a supply that was partly input taxed and partly GST under item 4 of sub-section 38-190(1) of the GST Act.  The ATO accepted that the fee may be partly GST-free, to the extent that the cardholder intends to use the credit card facility outside Australia.

The applicant’s contentions were as follows:

  • The findings of the High Court in Travelex Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 333 should be extended to credit card annual fees. The supply of banknotes was found by the High Court to be “in relation to rights” because it is the rights attaching to the physical banknotes that gave them their value and that this principle applied equally to credit cards, because the, too, have a physical aspect of negligible value without the attached rights (i.e., the plastic card).
  • Whilst the payment of the annual fee is for the issue of the credit card, the annual fee is not consideration for the provision of an interest in or under a credit arrangement.  Rather, it was contended that what the customer obtained when paying the fee was the right to use the credit card, which was  right to credit.  This supply of  aright to credit is GST-free under item 4(a) of subsection 38-190(1) of the GST Act.

With regards to the applicant’s contentions re the decision in Travelex, the ATO considered that the plastic card was clearly distinguishable from foreign currency banknotes – the cardholder acquired no proprietary interest in the card and the card was much less of a token of value and rights than banknotes because it is not, of itself, a negotiable instrument – the card itself has not rights attached to it and it is not money in any form.

The ATO accepted that the credit card facility is a supply that may be additionally characterised as a supply of rights and that the supply may be GST-free as a supply to which s 38-190(1) applied.  For the annual fee to be party GST-free, it would need to be shown that the credit arrangement is specifically intended to be used outside Australia – that is, the cardholder intends to use the credit card facility outside Australia.

101192440447 – GST and Electricity Rebate Agreement

The question here was whether a government entity made a creditable acquisition where it paid money to retailers under an agreement whereby electricity retailers gave a rebate to eligible persons.

Not surprisingly, the ruling agreed that a creditable acquisition was made.  While the basis for this view was GSTR 2006/9 (the Ruling on “supplies”), such a conclusion would appear to be irresistible given the decision of the Full Federal Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Secretary to the Department of Transport (Victoria) [2010] FCAFC 84, which found that the Department was entitled to input tax credits for payments made to taxi cab operators under a program where taxi services were provided to people with disabilities.

More surprisingly, the ruling denied the existence of a creditable acquisition for rebates paid “retrospectively” to rebate customers (being claims for 12 months or more prior to the customer making a separate application for the rebate).  The basis for this view was that the Electricity Retailer had not made a supply to the government entity and the payment for the retrospective rebate was a third party payment.  Rather, the payment to the Retailer was an administrative arrangement to pay on behalf of the customer for a liability owed by the customer to the Retailer.

Given that both the rebate and the Retrospective rebate are payment under the same arrangement between the government entity and the Electricity Rebate, one may have cause to doubt the existence of a real distinction between those payments.  The decision may also show that the Commissioner is still not comfortable with the decision in Department of Transport and is seeking to give that decision a narrow compass.

Commissioner issues GSTD 2011/3 – RITCs and financial supply providers

On 1 December 2011 the Commissioner issued GSTD 2011/3 ‘Goods and services tax: do the acquisitions of the services provided under the arrangement described in Taxpayer Alert TA 2010/1 form part of a reduced credit acquisition made by the financial supply provider under item 9 of the table in in sub regulation 70-5.02(2) of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Regulations 1999?’

The Determination was previously issued as draft GSTD 2011/D2 and is based upon the arrangement outlined in Taxpayer Alert TA 2010/1.

My comments on the Determination can be found here.

Mold and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 823 – Tribunal allows partial increase in input tax credits

On 18 November 2011 the Tribunal handed down its decision in Mold and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 823.  The case essentially involved the issue of whether the applicant could substantiate input tax credits in the absence of tax invoices, but the decision does provide an interesting insight into the capacity of the Tribunal (while sitting in the shoes of the Commissioner) to step outside the somewhat prescriptive rules in which the Commissioner sometimes operates when conducting investigations into the affairs of taxpayers.

The applicant was a cabinet maker who the subject of an audit.  During the periods in questions the applicant suffered periods of ill-health, which meant that the business was not as profitable as it might have been.  Following the audit, the taxpayer was assessed for GST shortfalls on the basis that claims for input tax credits could not be substantiated.  The applicant claimed that he posted the relevant tax invoices to the Commissioner, who says they were not received.  This left the applicant in the difficult position of not being able to substantiate those input tax credits.

The applicant was able to provide some information to substantiate the credit claims, including tax invoices from previous periods and bank statements.  The Commissioner accepted that the applicant was entitled to some of the input tax credits, but only to the upper extent of the industry standard for cabinet makers.

Senior Member O’Loughlin accepted that the applicant did have a significant amount of documentation of the expenditures associated with the business and that he no longer had it as a consequence of at least attempting to provide it to the Commissioner.  The Tribunal also accepted that some “surrogate” information was provided, but not enough to substantiate all the claims. The Tribunal found that a balance needed to be struck between the onus on the applicant to prove his assessments are excessive and where the applicant experiences difficulties because his attempts to do so rendered him unable to do so.

In determining this balance, the Tribunal found that the industry range was not appropriate, in circumstances where the applicant had suffered a serious illness that undoubtedly impacted his business activities and it can readily be concluded that he may not be within industry norms.  Accordingly, something more than the industry average was appropriate.  Instead of the upper range of the industry average of 44% of the GST on sales revenue, the Tribunal awarded credits of 72.87%.

This decision is a good example of how the Tribunal is often in a better position to consider the particular circumstances of a case, as opposed to the Commissioner who is sometimes distracted by things such as industry standards.  It is also clear that the Tribunal found the applicant to be an honest and credible witness, which is always a good start.

 

 

Taxpayers file Appeals in GST refund cases

The Federal Court Portal shows that on 28 November 2011 the taxpayers filed appeals against the decisions of the Tribunal (constituted by President Downes and Senior Member O’Loughlin) in MTAA Superannuation Fund (RG Casey Building) Property Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 769 and National Jet Systems Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 766 which were handed down on 31 October 2011.

The callover for both appeals is scheduled for 7 February 2012 before Justice Gray.

Given that Justice Downes was a member of the Tribunal, the appeal will be heard by the Full Court (s 44(3) of the Administrative Appeals Act).

Both matters concerned a claim for a refund of GST overpaid in respect of agreements which the applicant contended were GST-free pursuant to s 13 of the GST Transition Act.  In each case the Commissioner contended that:

  • the agreements were taxable
  • the notification lodged by the applicant was not a valid notification for the purposes of s 105-55 of Schedule 1 to the TAA
  • if a refund was available, the discretion in s 105-65 of Schedule 1 to the TAA entitled the Commissioner to refuse to pay the refunds
In the National Jet matter, there was also an application for an extension of time to object to a number of tax periods.  The Commissioner refused to grant the extension of time.

In both decisions the Tribunal found that:

  • the notifications lodged by the applicants were valid
  • the agreements were not GST-free pursuant to s 13 of the GST Transition Act
  • if a refund was available, no refund should be paid because this would give rise to a windfall gain to either the applicant or the recipient of the supply
  • for the National Jet matter, the extension of time should not be granted

One would expect that the Commissioner will file a Notice of Contention in both matters contending that the notifications were not valid.  This would be consistent with the approach taken in the appeal by the taxpayer of the decision in Central Equity Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 908 where Justice Gordon found that a notification lodged in similar form was valid.

Commissioner issues draft Practice Statements on penalties for false or misleading statements

On 24 November 2011 the Commissioner issued the following draft Law Administration Practice Statements:

The essential difference between the two practice statements appears to be that where there is a shortfall amount, the penalty is imposed by reference to a percentage of the shortfall (i.e., 75% for intentional disregard, 50% for reckless and 25% for failure to take reasonable care); and where there is no shortfall amount, the penalty is imposed by reference to “penalty units” (currently $110 to 1 penalty unit) – being 60 units for intentional disregard, 40 units for reckless and 20 units for failure to take reasonable care.

A more detailed analysis of these statements will follow in the next few days, but my initial concern is that the scope to apply penalties where there is no shortfall is very wide and, in the GST space, could apply to things such as:

  • BAS statements
  • “stop the clock” notifications pursuant to s 105-55 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act
  • Objections

Indeed, the writer is aware of the ATO imposing penalties on taxpayers who lodged “stop the clock notices” to protect their rights to claim GST refunds – those penalties were subsequently remitted on the basis that the taxpayers took reasonable care, but it does illustrate the potential scope for the application of this penalty regime.

The potential broad scope of these penalties appears to be accepted in the draft Practice Statement, when regard is had to statements such as:

  • “The penalty law, on its face, has a broad application to written and verbal statements made relating to all taxes, and could apply to compliance, objection, advice, debt, lodgement and registration activities” [at 14]
  • “Statements which do not result in a shortfall amount will be examined (including for the purposes of assessing penalty) where ATO action is required to investigate or mitigate a risk.” [at 17]

Where a misstatement leads to a GST shortfall, one can understand the risk of penalties being imposed by reference to the amount of that shortfall.  However, where one forms the view that GST has been overpaid, it is another thing to be potentially exposed to a financial penalty where steps are taken to claim that refund from the ATO or to initiate the review procedure in Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act.

Comments on the draft Practice Statements are due by 27 January 2012.

High Court grants Commissioner’s application for expedited Special Leave application in Multiflex

On 21 November 2011 Justice Gummow of the High Court granted the Commissioner’s application for an expedited timetable for the hearing of the Application for Special Leave to appeal from the decision of the Full Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Multiflex Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 142.  The transcript from the application can be accessed here and my analysis of the decision of the Full Federal Court can be accessed here.

The application for special leave will be heard in Sydney on Friday 9 December 2011.

On 19 November 2011 Justice Edmonds of the Federal Court granted a stay of the judgment of the Full Federal Court until 13 December 2011.  If the Commissioner is successful in the application for special leave, he will no doubt ask the High Court to extend the stay.  My post on the decision to grant the stay can be accessed here.

Federal Court grants stay in Multiflex pending special leave application – expedition hearing on Monday

In Commissioner of Taxation v Multiflex Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1316, Justice Edmonds granted the Commissioner’s application that the orders of the Full Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Multiflex Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 142 be stayed pending an application by the Commissioner for special leave to appeal to the High Court. A discussion of the decision of the Full Court can be found here.

The stay did not come cheap for the Commissioner, who was required to pay half of the refunds in issue as a condition of the stay being extended to 13 December 2011 (with the hope that the application for special leave can be heard at the sitting on 9 December 2011 – the judgment states that the Commissioner filed an application for special leave was filed on 15 November 2011 and that an application for expedition of the application would also be filed).  The High Court list shows that the expedition application will be heard before Gummow J on Monday 21 November 2011 at 9.30am at High Court in Melbourne (by video link with Sydney).

The decision of Edmonds J is interesting.  His Honour appeared to take the view that the threshold for the Federal Court granting a stay was lower than for the High Court.  His Honour referred to the following statement of Brennan J in Jennings Construction Limited v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 681 at 684:

A stay to preserve the subject-matter of litigation pending an application for special leave to appeal is an extraordinary jurisdiction and exceptional circumstances must be shown before its exercise is warranted. [emphasis added]

Nevertheless, his honour found that the threshold in the Federal Court would not seem to require ‘exceptional’ or ‘special’ reasons for the stay, merely a requirement on the part of the applicant for a stay pending the determination of an appeal to demonstrate ‘a reason or an appropriate case to warrant the exercise of discretion in his favour’.

His Honour made the following findings:

  • he was far from satisfied on the evidence that a stay was required to preserve the subject matter of the litigation;
  • there was a real prospect that the High Court would conclude that it was not appropriate to grant special leave;
  • the refusal of the Commissioner to pay the refunds would cause loss to Multiflex.

Notwithstanding the above matters, his Honour found that, marginally, the balance of convenience lay in favour of granting the stay on the conditions set out in the orders.

The Court also noted that if the High Court does not grant the Commissioner’s application for expedition, or if it is granted and special leave is given, it would be open to the Commissioner to apply for a further stay of the Full Court’s orders.  Given the statement of Brennan J referred to above, one might think that the Commissioner would face significant difficulties in such an application.

Commissioner issues GST Determination on Subdivision 38-O – Farm land

On 16 November 2011 the Commissioner issued GSTD 2011/2 – Goods and services tax: can a ‘farming business’ be carried on, for the purposes of paragraph 38-480(a) of the GST Act where there has been a cessation of routine farming activities by the supplier for a period of time as a consequence of a decision to sell the land?

The Commissioners says that the answer can be yes, although the question will be one of fact and degree depending on the circumstances of each case.

There is nothing particularly surprising in the determination, save for the apparent approach of the Commissioner to equate the term “carrying on a farming business” with the more expansive concept of “carrying on an enterprise”, so as to include acts done in the the commencement and termination of the farming business.

Paragraph 38-480(a) relevantly provides that the supply of of a freehold interest in land is GST-free if “the land is land on which a *farming business has been *carried on for at least the period of 5 years preceding the supply.”  Section 38-475(2) provides that an entity “carries on a farming business” if it carries on the business of [those matters listed at paragraphs (a)-(d)].

In the Determination, the Commissioner adopts the following approach:

  • if an entity carries on a business consisting of one of the classes of farming, the entity is carrying on an enterprise that is a farming business;
  • carrying on an enterprise is defined in s 195-1 to include ‘anything done in the course of the commencement of the enterprise’;
  • accordingly, for the purposes of paragraph 38-480(a), carrying on a farming business includes all the routine farming activities carried out on the land together with any other activities related to the commencing, conducting and terminating the farming business.

While one can understand the logic of this approach, I am not sure that it is consistent with the words used in the act. The provisions requirements in 38-475(2) as to when an entity “carries on a farming business” are quite specific, whereas the broad definition of “carrying on” in s 195-1 is limited to “enterprise”.  In this regard, the view in the Determination of what constitutes the carrying on of a farming business may be broader than actually provided for in the legislation.  This will probably not be an issue for taxpayers as it potentially serves to increase the scope of the GST-free exemption for farmland.

Some matters not dealt with in the Determination, which may cause issues down the track are:

  • how long is the “period of time” for which an entity can cease routine farming activities before selling the land?
  • Can an entity cease farming activities and effectively leave the property “dormant” while trying to sell the land,  or do steps have to be taken towards trying to sell the land before ceasing the farming activities?

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case Analysis in Multiflex – off to the High Court?

The decision of the Full Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Multiflex Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 142 has real implications for the Commissioner and how he administers the GST Act.  My analysis of the decision can be accessed here.

Also, colleagues who attended the judgment inform me that Counsel for the Commissioner informed the Court that the Commissioner would look to bring an urgent application for special leave to appeal before the High Court.  The Commissioner has also made an application to stay the judgment (i.e. to stay the order to pay the refund) and this application is to be heard by Justice Edmonds next week.

If the Commissioner does bring an application for special leave, along with the Qantas application, he will have two applications for special leave regarding GST.  So much for GST being a “practical business tax”.

Cases update – Commissioner ordered to pay Indemnity Costs and Role of Tribunal on review of Private Rulings

Amongst the excitement of the appeal and decision of the Full Federal Court in the Multiplex case (I will post my analysis of the decision on Monday), during the last week there were two decisions handed down which also warrant a mention.  The cases do not directly involve GST, but are nevertheless important decisions.

Indemnity costs ordered against the Commissioner

In Commissioner of Taxation v Clark [2011] FCAFC 140 (10 November 2011) the Full Federal Court granted the taxpayer’s application that the Commissioner pay indemnity costs of the appeal as from the date on which an offer of compromise was made.  A similar order was made by the Federal Court in International All Sports Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2011] FCA 1027 and my post on that decision can be accessed here.

The taxpayer was successful at first instance and during the course of the appeal by the Commissioner, made an offer of compromise of $5,000 plus the Commissioner’s costs of the appeal to date.  The Commissioner rejected the offer on the basis that it was significantly below the tax thought to be owed by the Commissioner – indeed, before the Full Court the Commissioner argued that the offer was “trivial”.

The Commissioner relied on a number of contentions, which the Court summarised into the following four propositions (at [20]):

  • the Commissioner is neither permitted nor obliged to take into account, in deciding whether to accept any of the offers, the outcome at first instance and the reasons given for that outcome;
  • the Commissioner asserts that his decision was taken in accordance with his own policies and procedures and that this assertion is an answer to the applications for costs on an indemnity basis;
  • the Commissioner has, by his prescription of policies and procedures, limited his own power to compromise litigation to which he is a party; and
  • any offer to settle, for the purposes of Order 23 of the Federal Court Rules, must involve the offer of a substantial amount, having regard to the amounts of the assessment in question.

While the Full Court did not reject the proposition that the Commissioner’s policies and procedures on settlement may, in an appropriate case, inform any exercise of the Court’s discretion on costs, the Court (at [28]) rejected the contention that these policies allowed the Commissioner to “escape the Court’s scrutiny of his conduct of litigation, including his conduct in refusing to accept offers of settlement”.  Interestingly, the Court made reference to the Commissioner’s response to the request for test case funding as being potentially relevant in considering this issue.

The Court rejected the other contentions by the Commissioner.  In doing so, the Court noted that the Commissioner faced significant problems in the appeal and that he should have taken those into account in the course of considering the offer.  In taking this view, the Full Court expected the Commissioner to take into account the same considerations faced by private taxpayers when conducting litigation.

This decision, along with that of Jessup J in International All Sports, have the potential to change the way taxpayers approach Part IVC litigation with the Commissioner.  One may expect to see a greater use of Offers of Compromise by taxpayers.  Also, it may put additional pressure on the Commissioner to agree to test-case fund more cases.

Private Rulings – the binding nature of the “arrangement”

In Yip and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 785 (4 November 2011) the Tribunal considered the scope of its role in an application to review a private ruling made by the Commissioner.  While the case involved Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, the case is nevertheless important for GST as it considered the private rulings regime under Chapter 5 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953, being the same provisions under which taxpayers can now object to GST private rulings.

The following points can be taken from the judgment:

  • the private ruling is made on the “arrangement”, which means the set of facts that constitute the arrangement.
  • the taxpayer specifies what the relevant facts are that constitute the arrangement.  The Commissioner may request further information, but once the private ruling is made the Commissioner and the taxpayer are bound by it.
  • When making a private ruling, the Commissioner does not make findings of fact, he simply identifies facts that then states his opinion about the way in which the relevant tax laws apply to the applicant in relation to those identified facts.
  • If a taxpayer seeks a review of the private ruling before the Tribunal, the subject matter of that review is the arrangement as identified by the Commissioner in his private ruling.  Upon review, the Tribunal is limited to the facts that constitute the arrangement.  The Commissioner and the Tribunal are bound by those facts.
There are lessons from this decision for those taxpayers who are looking to request, or to object to,a GST private ruling, as well as for the Commissioner.  While it remains true that a private ruling is only effective to the extent that the facts of the arrangement reflect what actually happens, this decision shows that it is not open to the Commissioner, the Tribunal (or indeed the taxpayer) to “re-open” the factual basis of the private ruling once it is made.